Methods Available to Monetary Policy Makers to Deal with Uncertainty by Katerina Smidkova
1





Three sources – research on monetary policy under uncertainty, the managerial literature, and
the real-life strategies of five inflation targeters – have been used to survey methods that are
available to monetary policy makers to deal with uncertainty. The methods have been
compared within a framework that is based on a decision matrix. The comparative framework
has been designed in order to encompass different representations of uncertainty employed by
various central banks. The results of comparative analysis suggest that central banks use
models, intuition, judgement as well as traditional managerial methods to deal with
uncertainty. This finding helps understanding why economic research cannot fully explain
differences between monetary policy actions and outcomes of model simulations. The results
of the comparative analysis also suggest that central banks have not so far fully utilised the
whole spectrum of methods available to them. Economic research, other banks’ strategies as
well as decision analysis may be interesting sources of inspiration when designing the
decision-making process. It is emphasised that central banks introducing inflation targeting
should pay equal attention to both building their forecasting models as well as selecting
methods to deal with uncertainty. In the case of emerging economies where uncertainty can be
much higher than in advanced economies, neglecting uncertainty may increase probability of
policy errors significantly.
Key words: Inflation targeting – Uncertainty – Decision matrix – Survey of methods
JEL classification: E520 E580 E590
                                                
 The paper has been prepared for the conference “Forecasting in a Central Bank”, Bank of England,
August 2003, London.
** Katerina Smidkova, Adviser to the Board, Czech National Bank. Comments are very welcome
(email: smidkova@cnb.cz). The views expressed in this paper are those of the author, and do not
necessarily represent those of the Czech National Bank. The author is grateful for comments and
suggestions to R. Barrell, A. Bulir, N. Batini, N. Bjorksten, A. Capek, C. Goodhart, M. Hrncir, T.
Holub, M. King, S. Nickell, L. Niedermayer, P. Robinson, T. Sargent, P. Stepanek, Z. Tuma and K.
Wallis.2
I.  Introduction
Methods to deal with uncertainty are important to monetary policy makers targeting inflation.
Inflation targeting is a forward-looking strategy that aims at setting interest rates to minimise
the expected sequence of deviations of inflation from the target. In a world of decision-
making, this means that monetary policy makers aim at what is called a “good” decision since
they select the policy reaction that yields the best expected outcome. In order to decide which
policy reaction is the “good” one, monetary policy makers need to consider a variety of
alternative scenarios, their probabilities as well as impacts of possible policy reactions.
Monetary policy makers employ two types of methods for this purpose. First, they employ
methods to analyse data and produce forecasts under specific assumptions. For example,
developing a forecasting model is a typical method of the first type. It has been often reported
that the forecasting model improves consistency of policy debates
1. Second, they employ
methods to deal with uncertainty. Uncertainty can be often related to various components of
the forecasting model and to crucial assumptions of the benchmark forecast, and
consequently, cannot be easily represented inside the model. Voting by members of the
Boards or Monetary policy committees is a typical method of the second type. It has been
demonstrated that sharing views about all available information within a group can improve
quality of decisions
2.
This paper puts emphasis on the fact that although monetary policy makers need both types of
methods for their decisions, the second type has not received equal attention. Economic
research often describes inflation targeting as inflation-forecast targeting where the forecast is
fully based on a model and normally distributed shocks
3. However, monetary policy makers
stress that they do not follow simplistic normative recommendations produced by models
4.
Monetary policy makers also emphasise that economic research focusing on the implication
of uncertainty for monetary policy
5 mainly analyses consequences of a very limited subset of
uncertainties
6. While the research focuses on uncertainties that can be easily represented with
simple statistical distributions in the model, real policy debates are influenced by more
substantial uncertainties
7. Although recent research has made significant progress in this
direction by approximating monetary policy decisions with Bayesian models that work with
                                                
1 Blinder (1998),  Budd (1998), and Vickers (1998) claim that the central forecast based on the model
helps organising policy discussions.
2 King (2002) supports this view and suggests that differences in views between individual members
of the Monetary Policy Committee help improving decisions. Blinder, Morgan (2000), Clemen,
Winkler (forthcoming) and Lombardelli, Proudman, Talbot (2002) all demonstrate that groups make
better decisions than individuals.
3 Battini, Haldane (1999) and Svensson (1996) illustrate features of inflation targeting in this set-up.
4 Monetary policy makers also emphasise that it is not possible to use policy rules for normative
recommendations. Issing (2002) points out that central banks must use frameworks that are much
more complex than policy rules.
5 Hund, Orr (1999) and Salmon, Martin (1999) summarise research related to implications of
uncertainty for monetary policy.
6 They use the definition of risk and uncertainty that can be found in Knight (1921) to illustrate this
point. According to this definition, monetary policy makers face a risk if they know a reliable estimate
of its probability distribution prior their decision. They are faced with uncertainty if a relevant
probability distribution cannot be easily estimated.
7 Blinder (1999), Freedman (1999) and Issing (1999) draw attention to the fact that economic research
does not solve the problems of Knightian uncertainty that is very difficult to approximate with
statistical distributions and that is often related to the forecasting model itself.3
more complex distributions and with robust control methods related to model uncertainty
8, the
research does not explicitly analyse methods to deal with uncertainty. For example, methods
of attaching subjective probabilities are not subject to research. The research also does not
suggest how monetary policy makers form their priors about Bayesian distributions. In
addition, methods employed to deal with uncertainty often receive less attention than methods
of the first type when monetary policy strategies are described. Specifically, when forecasting
systems are designed and analysed, methods to deal with uncertainty are not described in as
much detail as the modelling framework
9. At the same time, economic research provides
enough evidence that monetary policy makers consider more factors than the model-based
forecasts and easily represented uncertainties. Otherwise, it would not be so difficult to
explain their decisions with model simulations and policy rules
10. The missing part in the
picture is consideration of all types of uncertainty. Monetary policy makers are aware of the
fact that forecasting the future is very complicated, and consequently, they employ a variety
of methods to deal with uncertainty, however informal or implicit this may be.
This paper has been motivated by the fact that there may be costs involved if the methods
employed by inflation targeters to deal with uncertainty are not treated explicitly. First,
monetary policy may not be fully transparent. This is specially a problem in periods when
uncertainty plays a more prominent role in decision-making than usual. Lack of transparency
can reduce the efficiency of monetary policy actions
11. In addition, lower transparency can
mislead economic research that analyses monetary policy under uncertainty
12. Second, central
banks cannot compare notes about these methods as easily as they can about their forecasting
models. As a result, the methods dealing with uncertainty might not be employed as
effectively as they could. Third, central banks that start targeting inflation may underestimate
the importance of these methods. These are usually central banks in emerging economies
where uncertainties about future economic developments are much larger than in advanced
market economies and where more attention should be paid to uncertainty.
These potential costs can be prevented. One possibility is suggested in this paper. A
framework for comparing methods to deal with uncertainty is developed in line with the
decision analysis. Decision analysis is used as a starting point because it has been employed
by decision-makers leading important institutions in many areas in order to make good
                                                
8 Cogley, Morozov, Sargent (2003) and Sims (2002) draw a parallel between behaviour of monetary
policy makers and Bayesian econometrics. Tetlow, von zur Muehlen (2000) apply robust control
methods to deal with model uncertainty. Cagliarini, Heath (2000) show that in papers on robust
control methods an inadequate decision rule is used. Similarly, Goodhart (2003) suggests that
minimising the costs of the worst possible scenario cannot approximate behaviour of monetary policy
makers. Both Cagliarini, Heath (2000) as well as Tetlow, von zur Muehlen (2000) emphasise that
results of their analysis depend on models selected for the analysis.
9 Pagan (2002) and Robertson (2000) compare forecasting systems of several central banks from
developed countries. Laxton, Scott (2000) suggest how to build a forecasting system for a central bank
in emerging economy. Methods to deal with uncertainty have not been emphasised in either case.
10 Orphanides (1998), Smets (1999) and Tetlow, von zur Muehlen (2000) focus on explaining
differences between behaviour of monetary policy makers and actions suggested by policy rules by
analysing implications of different types of uncertainty.
11 Geraats  (2001) summarises arguments for higher transparency.
12 One can observe from current debate –as for example outlined by Cagliarini, Heath (2000) and
Tetlow, von zur Muehlen (2000) – that it is not easy for researchers to approximate methods used by
monetary policy makers to deal with uncertainty.4
decisions under uncertainty
13. This comparative framework is then used for describing
methods that are available to deal with uncertainty according to three distinct sources – the
economic literature on monetary policy under uncertainty, the managerial literature on
decision analysis, and the real-life strategies of five inflation targeters
14. The resulting study
can be used by inflation targeters to compare their methods employed to deal with uncertainty
to those employed by other central banks, other decision-makers and to the suggestions of
economic research. The study can also help new inflation targeters to design their decision-
making process.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section, the role of methods dealing
with uncertainty is discussed in more detail. In the third section, the general structure of
decision matrix is described and the matrix is constructed for the monetary policy case. In the
fourth section, the comparative framework for methods dealing with uncertainty is developed
according to the structure of the decision matrix. In the following five sections, methods that
are available to monetary policy makers to deal with uncertainty at each stage of the decision
making process are surveyed.  The tenth section summarises the implications that a specific
selection of methods dealing with uncertainty can have for external communication.
Concluding remarks recapitulate major similarities and differences between methods
employed by central banks. Lessons that can be learnt from economic research and from
decision analysis are outlined. Several specific topics for further research are suggested.
II.  Role of Methods Dealing with Uncertainty
The description of monetary decision-making process is very similar to other areas of
decision-making
15. After experts analyse all available data and produce a central forecast with
their modelling tools, monetary policy makers face considerable uncertainty related to
assumptions of the central forecast and various limitations of the employed analytical and
modelling tools. Monetary policy makers must apply a combination of various methods in
order to overcome this problem and make good decisions. Specifically, if their judgement
suggests that policy implications of the central forecast do not correspond to the good
decision, they may require experts to produce alternative forecast. This means that monetary
policy makers use two types of methods during their decision-making process: (i) methods to
analyse data and to produce forecasts and (ii) methods to deal with uncertainty. Both types of
methods have an important role. Hence, neither should be neglected during the monetary
decision-making process. Both types of the methods should be described to the general public
in order to avoid costs of lowered transparency
16. Specifically, if methods dealing with
uncertainty are neglected in external communication, the general public can be lead to
thinking that the central forecast is fully unconditional and that any deviation of actual
inflation from the forecast is the result of a monetary policy error. Consequently, the
credibility of the inflation targeting strategy can be diminished.
                                                
13 Beroggi (1998) Clemen (1996)  and Skinner (1999) provide good introduction to decision theory
and decision analysis.
14 Smidkova (2003) describes the background of the survey in more detail. For summary, see
Appendix II.
15 Smidkova (2003) suggests that although monetary policy makers are not always viewed as decision-
makers, methods to deal with uncertainty designed for decision makers leading important institutions
in other areas are relevant for monetary policy as well.
16 Costs of lower transparency are illustrated in Geraats (2001).5
Methods of first type ensure that all available information is assessed in a systematic way, and
the policy debate is consistent. Policy makers emphasise that producing the model-based
central forecast is a very good way of organising the internal policy debate and obtaining the
benchmark case around which the opinions of individual policy makers can be formed
17.
Methods of the second type ensure that uncertainty is not neglected and policy interest rates
are not changed solely according to the central inflation forecast. Otherwise, changes in policy
interest rates could be too large or too small with respect to optimal policy responses
18.
Methods dealing with uncertainty also prevent the problems with overstated uncertainty. If
too many potential uncertainties are considered
19, alternative forecasts can be too far away
from each other and they cannot give monetary policy makers a clear picture of how to set
interest rates. In both cases, sub-optimal policy reactions can burden the economy with
otherwise avoidable costs, for example, with excessive output volatility.
Since the aim of this paper is to compare methods that are available to monetary policy
makers to deal with uncertainty, the distinction between the two types of methods has been
necessary. Although in the following sections these methods are described independently
from the methods used to produce the forecast, in practice both types of methods may be
either relatively independent or very closely interconnected. For example, the forecasting
model can be used to illustrate the most likely scenario, and subsequently, risks can be
attached to this central forecast verbally during the monetary policy meeting. Alternatively,
the central forecast can be re-done several times according to risks attached to each version in
order to represent implications of a policy reaction that is close to the good decision.
Sometimes, central banks can opt for a compromise solution. For example, if monetary policy
decisions are taken on a monthly basis, a full forecasting exercise can be run on a quarterly
basis and methods dealing with uncertainty can be used in order to assess a new distribution
of risks between two forecasting exercises. It is also worth noting that the importance of
methods dealing with uncertainty does not remain unchanged over time. It depends on the
forecasting errors of the core model, frequency of the structural breaks, size of the expected
shocks and on divergence in views of individual monetary policy makers and experts.
III.  The Decision Matrix
The framework for comparison of methods employed to deal with uncertainty should be quite
general since methods can differ quite substantially. We suggest basing the comparative
framework on the structure of the so-called “decision matrix” a tool designed by decision
analysis to support decisions under uncertainty
20. The decision matrix describes all important
components of the decision-making process and helps organising together very different types
of information that are all necessary for taking good decisions. For example, alternative
assumptions and subjective probabilities are represented with columns of the matrix and
possible policy reactions with the rows of the matrix. The decision matrix can also encompass
                                                
17 Blinder (1998),  Budd (1998), and Vickers (1998) give arguments why monetary policy makers
organise their decision-making process around the central forecast based on the model.
18 Brainard (1967) makes a case for more conservative monetary policy under uncertainty. Leiderman
(1999) makes case for more aggressive monetary policy under uncertainty.
19 For example, methods dealing with uncertainty should eliminate the problem of low probability
events that is described in Svensson (2003).
20 According to Anderson, Sweeney, Williams (2000), the decision matrix is also called pay-off table or
pay-off matrix since elements of this matrix are usually represented with calculated  pay-offs.6
different representations of uncertainty used by central banks such as a two scenario approach
or fan charts. These propositions are illustrated in Appendix I
21.
The decision matrix can include all information considered by monetary policy makers:
variant forecasts, subjective probabilities of alternative scenarios and pay-offs derived from
their loss functions. We use this framework to illustrate that monetary policy makers organise
their decision-making process similarly to other decision-makers leading important
institutions in other areas, however informal or implicit this may be. This does not mean that
all elements of the decision matrix are calculated mechanically by central banks prior to their
monetary policy decisions. It only means that all information is considered prior to decisions.
Following examples illustrate three possible approaches to dealing with uncertainty within the
framework of decision matrix. The calculations are explained in more detail in Appendix I.
In the first case, the decision matrix consists of one column only and the major emphasis is
put on the most likely scenario (Table III.1). The central forecast was produced with the core
model, working with a fixed-rate assumption. In addition, the model was used to estimate
implications of two additional possible policy reactions. It is worth noting that a similar
approach can be used if the model includes endogenous monetary policy. In that case, three
different reaction functions can be used that represent neutral, slow and aggressive
responsiveness of monetary policy to shocks
22. In our example, each outcome was evaluated
by a loss function. As a result, the decision matrix consists of three pay-offs. It implies that
only a partial policy assessment can be done. If we select the policy reaction that yields the
best pay-off, we will leave interest rates unchanged.
Table III.1 – One-Column Decision Matrix: “The Best of the Most Probable” Rule





Reduction in interest rates 1.216
No change in interest rates   1.212*
Increase in interest rates 1.215
Note: Pay-offs are values of the loss function. Hence, the best pay-off is the one with the lowest value.
See Appendix I for calculations.
*) This is the pay-off of the central forecast.
In the second case, the decision matrix incorporates much more information (Table III.2).
Uncertainty related to the most likely case is represented by two alternative sets of
assumptions that were specified by experts in order to represent deflation and inflation risks.
Alternative sets of assumptions may have included, for example, different paths for
exogenous variables or different model equations. For each set of assumptions, implications
of three possible policy reactions were estimated and the pay-offs calculated. As a result, we
can consider nine pay-offs. The pay-offs indicate that risks were very asymmetric. However,
the decision matrix is still incomplete since we do not know the probabilities of alternative
sets of assumptions. In this case, we can use one of the decision rules not requiring this
                                                
21 Calculations presented in Appendix I are based on the small forecasting model of the Czech
economy, data set and assessments of the Czech economic outlook from July 2001.
22 Both approaches to inflation forecasting are possible. Don (2001) argues that a conditional forecast
is more suitable for institutions that can affect the whole economy and that an unconditional forecast
causes a difficult decision problem for them. Archer (2003) claims that central banks should base their
forecasts on models with endogenous monetary policy. The survey summarised in Appendix II show
that central banks use both approaches in reality.7
information
23. For example, the least risky policy reaction can be selected. This is the
approach taken by papers using the robustness control method for analysis of implications of
uncertainty. As a result, we will decrease interest rates.
Table III.2 – Incomplete Decision Matrix:  “Maximin” Rule
Probability










Reduction in interest rates 13.207 1.216 1.431 13.207
No change in interest rates 13.432   1.212* 1.300 13.432
Increase in interest rates 13.663 1.215 1.175 13.663
Note: Pay-offs are values of the loss function. Maximin decision rule finds the worst pay-off for each
possible policy reaction and selects the reaction with the minimal worst pay-of. See Appendix I for
calculations.
*) This is the pay-off of the central forecast.
In the third case, the decision matrix is complete. It combines all types of available
information (Table III.3). In addition to previously considered information, we have now
attached our own subjective probabilities to all alternative sets of assumptions. It is worth
noting that the set of neutral  assumptions on which the central forecast was based usually
represents the most likely case, but it need not to be the case. The subjective probabilities can
be derived in various ways. For example, we could have asked a group of experts to vote, and
then construct probabilities according to number of votes that each set of assumptions had
been given. With the complete decision matrix, we can use different decision rules to
determine the adequate level of interest rates. Specifically, we are able to select the reaction
with the best expected pay-off. According to this rule, which is sometimes called a “rational”
rule, we will increase interest rates.
Table III.3 – Decision Matrix: “The Best Expected Value” Rule











Reduction in interest rates 13.207 1.216 1.431 2.501
No change in interest rates 13.432   1.212* 1.300 2.469
Increase in interest rates 13.663 1.215 1.175 2.444
Note: Pay-offs are values of the loss function. See Appendix I for calculations.
*) This is the pay-off of the central forecast.
The three examples illustrate the importance of treating uncertainty explicitly. Specifically, if
the decision matrix is incomplete as a result of neglected uncertainty, a policy reaction that
does not have the best expected pay-off is selected. If the decision matrix is complete as a
result of considering a variety of alternative forecasts, policy reactions and attaching
subjective probabilities, a good decision is made. The difference in decisions is caused by
significant asymmetric uncertainty and by subjective probabilities that evaluate one of the
alternative sets of scenarios as very likely. This documents that methods dealing with
uncertainty may be important for monetary policy makers in situations when the certainty
                                                
23 Smidkova (2003) gives more examples of decision rules that do not require subjective probabilities.8
equivalence principle does not hold
24. If alternative sets of assumptions are asymmetric,
probabilities of alternative sets of assumptions are significant and asymmetric or the core
model is non-linear then methods dealing with uncertainty will be influential. In addition,
asymmetric loss functions or a prevailing divergence of inflation and output from the targeted
values will have similar impact
25.
It is worth noting that although calculations in our examples look simple, information
represented by various components of the decision matrix is not always easily obtained.
Specifically, it is not straightforward at all to define alternative sets of assumptions. Although
there are model-based methods available to help with this task, such as sensitivity analysis or
impulse response analysis, their definition relies enormously on the intuition and judgement
of experts and monetary policy makers.
IV.  The Comparative Framework
The main purpose of the following sections is to present in a comprehensible way findings of
the survey of methods available to monetary policy makers to deal with uncertainty
26. Three
distinct sources have been used to compile the survey. First, economic research on monetary
policy under uncertainty employs the certainty equivalence principle to draw implications of
different types of uncertainty for monetary policy decisions. Subsequently, the research
findings are used to explain differences between actual decisions and decisions predicted by
the model. The findings confirm that monetary policy makers consider uncertainty to a
significant extent
27. Economic research also provides background for dealing with certain
types uncertainties that can be incorporated into the model framework
28.
Secondly, the “real-life” methods of five inflation targeters document that monetary policy
makers do not limit themselves to producing the central forecast when deciding about interest
rates. They typically rely on a combination of various methods to deal with uncertainty. For
example, several central banks attach subjective distributions to the central forecast in order to
produce fan charts. Several banks use alternative scenarios to deal with uncertainty about
                                                
24In line with Brainard (1967), the certainty benchmark is defined as the policy reaction that would be
optimal under certainty. Under uncertainty, optimal policy reaction is different. According to the
certainty equivalence principle, certain types of uncertainty, such as linear symmetric risks, do not
change optimal policy.
25 Srour (1999) provides an analysis of implications of different types of uncertainty (linear, non-
linear, parameter, model) for monetary policy. Don (2001) illustrates that if there are several users of
the forecast, their loss functions should be aggregated in order to derive the optimal policy reaction.
However, this aggregation is not easy and can result for example into asymmetric loss function. Issing
(2002) stress that strategic uncertainty that is related to expectations has serious and complex
implications for monetary policy. The disinflation process in emerging economies can have this type
of effect.
26 The background of the survey is described in Smidkova (2003).
27 Hall, Salmon, Yates, Batini (1999) and Srour (1999) demonstrate that implications of different types
of uncertainty for monetary policy are not the same. Hunt, Orr (1999) and Levin, Wieland, Williams
(1999) illustrate that uncertainty is the reason behind differences between actions taken by monetary
policy makers and actions suggested by policy rules.
28 Cogley, Morozov, Sargent (2003), Sims (2001) and Wallis (forthcoming) offer sophisticated
econometric tools to deal with uncertainty that can be expressed within the model.    9
important external factors such as commodity prices. And some let a group of experts vote
about the policy recommendation prior to the meeting of the monetary policy makers
29.
Thirdly, various methods offered by decision theory and decision analysis have been
examined. This part of the survey has been focused more on methods that are less
mathematically rigorous and more rely on intuition and judgement, such as the Delphi
method, since the methods that are rooted in mathematics, such as Bayesian techniques, are
already covered by economic research. Many decision analysis tools work with subjective
evaluation of uncertainties and are aimed at reaching good decisions in an uncertain world
30.
Some forecasters have already used the decision theory framework to recommend methods of
presenting the forecast uncertainty to decision makers
31.
Since a relatively broad range of methods has been compiled from the survey, it has been
important to organise the survey around a suitable comparative framework in order to make
the findings clearer. Therefore methods dealing with uncertainty compiled from the survey
have been grouped together according to components of the decision matrix to which they are
related. Hence, it is easy to see which methods can be incorporated into different components
of the monetary decision-making process. It is worth noting that this approach differs from
ones that try to incorporate all components of the decision-making process into the model,
such as robust control methods or Bayesian models. We try to show various methods that can
be employed to deal with uncertainty, including ones based on judgement and intuition,
instead of modelling the whole process from the observer’s perspective.
During the work on the survey, it has become clear that it is important to distinguish two
stages of the decision-making process. In the first stage, experts produce the forecast and
conduct robustness analysis. The outcome of the first phase can be presented as the so-called
robustness matrix
32. Each simulation exercise based on one set of assumptions including a
monetary policy action can be represented as one element of the robustness matrix that
illustrates the divergence of inflation forecast from target under a specific set of assumptions.
In addition, the subjective probabilities of alternative sets of assumptions attached by a group
of experts to each set of assumptions can be also components of the robustness matrix. If
experts recommend a policy reaction, this is represented with a corresponding decision rule.
Although we speak about experts, monetary policy makers can be also members of the expert
group. For example, monetary policy makers may participate in debates about alternative sets
of assumptions. The elements of robustness matrix are presented by experts to monetary
policy makers. Consequently, information contained in the robustness matrix is explicit.
In the second stage, monetary policy makers make use of all information represented by the
robustness matrix. In addition, they use all other information available to them, their
judgement, intuition and preferences in order to derive their own expected pay-offs before
deciding about interest rates. This implies that the decision matrix need not be identical to the
                                                
29 Results of the survey on the country-specific methods to deal with uncertainty are reported in
Šmídková (2003). Appendix II gives summary of the findings for the purposes of this paper.
30 Clemen (1996), Skinner (1999) and Wright, Goodwin (1998) give examples of tools that work with
subjective probabilities such as decision matrix, decision tree and pay-off table.
31 Don (2001) uses decision theory terminology and argues that the role of the forecast is to help to
reach competent decisions.
32 Rosenhead, Mingers (2001) use the robustness matrix in order to organise results of the robustness
analysis.10
robustness matrix  and that it can remain implicit. The components of the decision matrix are
derived by individual policy makers for their own use. However, various components of the
decision matrix can be revealed to experts and general public after decision, for example by
publishing votes. Although monetary policy makers decide about interest rates according to
their own expected pay-offs, it is still beneficial for them to have information about expert
views on subjective probabilities and pay-offs. Monetary policy makers can benefit from
knowing the complete robustness matrix because it represents expert knowledge that is
difficult to express within the model framework. According to decision analysis, averaging of
assessments of several experts can improve the quality of the forecast. Similarly, averaging of
assessments obtained from different methods can be also beneficial. When monetary policy
makers work with the complete robustness matrix, they employ both types of averaging
simultaneously and are more likely to make good decisions
33.
Central banks often design their decision-making process as iterative
34. This implies that some
components of the decision-making process are repeated several times. Specifically, after the
central forecast and robustness analysis is conducted by experts, monetary policy makers may
conclude that the resulting picture of the economy is too different from their views and that
they would have to do major adjustments in the second stage of the decision-making process.
In other words, the decision matrix would be too different from the robustness one.  As a
result, they may ask experts to change the assumptions of central forecast, and subsequently,
all information represented in the robustness matrix. It follows that the iterations aim at
modifying assumptions of the central forecast in order to better reflect the scenario with the
best expected outcome. Without these iterations, the central forecast could not play a
prominent role in the actual decision and in external communication. Asymmetric risks
attached to the central forecast are one possible reason for initiating changes in assumptions
of the central forecast
35. However, producing the central forecast with balanced risks through
the iterative process is not easy, and consequently, the full forecasting rounds are typically
less frequent than actual monetary policy decisions. As a result, some methods dealing with
uncertainty, such as attaching subjective probabilities, can play more prominent role between
the two full forecasting rounds.
Due to its iterative nature, the monetary decision-making process need not to be organised in
the same order as reported in the paper where each of the sections corresponds to one
component of the decision matrix. In line with the structure of the decision matrix, we group
the methods into the following five sections (sections V-IX):
                                                
33 Clemen, Winkler (forthcoming) show that adding an expert to the group as well as adding methods
improves the quality of decisions with diminishing returns and that adding the expert helps more than
working with and additional method of analysis.
34 All five inflation targeters from the survey report strategies that are similar to iterations. For
example, the Swedish Riksbank describes its decision-making process as follows. The main scenario
and risks are mostly prepared by experts. If the Board disagrees with the outcome of the process, the
main scenario or inflation forecast distribution can be adjusted.
35 Monetary policy makers emphasise that asymmetry in risks poses a serious problem to them. They
may try to reduce the potential asymmetry in risks during the monetary decision-making process.
These observations have been made by C. Goodhart and L. Niedermayer.11
1)  the central forecast
2)  elements of the robustness matrix
3)  the pay-offs attached by expert group
4)  subjective probabilities attached by expert group
5)  deciding about interest rates by monetary policy makers.
V.  Producing Central Forecast
The central forecast corresponds to the central element of the robustness matrix. When it is
produced, there are three methods to deal with uncertainty available (See Table V.1). First, a
broad set of information about the core model can be compiled. For example, an extensive
sensitivity tests can be reported, including ones reflecting sensitivity of the inflation forecast
to the level of interest rates or to the specification of the reaction function. Secondly,
estimates of the uncertainties that can be easily represented within the core model can be
attached to the central forecast. Thirdly, a list of potential uncertainties can be compiled by
experts while they work on the central forecast. The list should consist of uncertainties that
are remarkable but are more difficult to represent within the core model. All three methods
aim at enlarging (and organising) a supplementary set of information that is produced together
with the central forecast. This stage is crucial since the larger the set of supplementary
information is, the more methods to deal with uncertainty can be employed at the later stages
of the process.
These three methods vary according to the tool that is being used in order to produce the
central forecast. Specifically, the more sophisticated the forecasting tool is, the broader the set
of supplementary information that can be produced. For example, the model-based forecasts
offer a possibility to consistently describe results of sensitivity analysis while expert forecasts
do not. In addition, stochastic models can provide estimates of some types of uncertainties. At
the same time, the larger sophistication is costly in terms of know-how, and consequently, in
terms of more complicated debate. Perhaps, this trade-off may be the reason why central
banks in our survey have stayed so far in the middle ground as far as the forecasting tool is
concerned while research papers have moved the technology frontier further. The example of
the CNB indicates that central banks from emerging economies may start with expert
forecasts when inflation targeting is introduced, and introduce fully model-based forecasts at a
later stage.12
Table V.1 – Producing Central Forecast
Stochastic forecast Model forecast Expert forecast
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Note: Abbreviations: BoE – Bank of England, BoC – Bank of Canada, CNB –Czech National Bank,
RBNZ – Reserve Bank of New Zealand, SR – Swedish Riksbank. CMS- Cogley, Morozov, Sargent
(2003), HSYB- Hall, Salmon, Yates, Batini (1999), KW – Wallis (forthcoming).
*) In this case, the method has not been applied to its full extent (explanation given in brackets).
VI.  Deriving Elements of the Robustness Matrix
By conducting robustness analysis related to the central forecast is produced, experts produce
information that corresponds to elements of the robustness matrix. By defining alternative
policy assumptions, they specify the rows of the matrix. Similarly, by selecting the alternative
sets of assumptions, they specify columns of the robustness matrix. By producing alternative
forecasts, experts (informally) produce all elements of the robustness matrix. This whole part13
of decision-making process is designed to deal with uncertainty. First, experts define the least
certain components of the central forecast and group them into several alternative sets of
assumptions. Second, experts produce the alternative forecasts in order to illustrate
distributions of uncertainties that are relevant for the actual decision (See Table VI.1). If the
robustness analysis is neglected, illustrations of relevant uncertainties are not available, and
there may be an insufficient background for making good decisions. The robustness analysis
is conducted in several steps. In the first step, a list of relevant uncertainties must be
compiled. Economic research suggests that including all uncertainties that can be represented
within the core model can be an option. However, this approach can lead to problems with
overstated uncertainty and does not so far offer a unified methodology for dealing with
uncertainties that are more difficult to describe. Since monetary policy makers are faced also
with off-model uncertainty
36, they cannot rely solely on methods developed so far by
economic research and they have to specify their list of relevant uncertainties by using less
formal approaches. Therefore it is very difficult to describe this step. Generally, all
supplementary information complied previously can be used together with the expert
judgement and intuition. There are various approaches available. For example, it is possible to
develop a rule of thumb. Every potential uncertainty that could change the inflation forecast
by x % or more could automatically qualify to the list of relevant uncertainties. Alternatively,
it is possible to rely on intuition and to illustrate several economic problems that are currently
debated (even in this case a relevant uncertainty should have a large potential impact on the
inflation forecast and have non-negligible probability)
37. The following examples illustrate the
potential candidates for list of relevant uncertainties:
  assumptions about an influential exogenous variable whose future path is uncertain
  residuals in an equation that is influential in the model and has large errors
  a functional form of  an influential equation that is subject to a structural break
  a role of the influential equation that is over-written by off-model information
  influential model components (e.g. long-run solution) that are not consensual.
In the second step, alternative forecast assumptions are constructed that correspond to the list
of relevant uncertainties, and they are grouped together into several sets. The grouping
determines how many columns the (informal) robustness matrix has and also what the role of
the central forecast is in the decision-making process. It is worth noting that alternative sets of
assumptions are not necessarily connected to the stochastic assessment of uncertainties, if this
was used previously. The construction of the alternative sets of assumptions may be more or
less complicated. There is an obvious trade-off. On one hand, a large number of sets is easy to
generate since each uncertainty can be treated separately, while a small number of sets is
more difficult to construct since it requires quite substantial debate about a suitable grouping.
On the other hand, a large number of sets is more difficult to discuss, while a small number of
sets helps an efficient policy debate. Due to this trade-off, central banks and other forecasting
institutions use between 2-5 alternative scenarios, preferring clearly more efficient debate
38.
Central banks use a small number of the alternative scenarios even when they use probability
distributions for representing uncertainty. These distributions are constructed mainly in order
                                                
36 Issing (2002) gives examples of the problems faced by monetary policy makers that cannot be dealt
with the so far available modelling methods.
37 It is worth noting that the process of deciding which uncertainties are relevant should eliminate
those that are not very likely and those that are not very influential. As a result, the problem of the
problem of low probability large extreme events that is analysed in Svensson (2003) should be
eliminated.
38 Don (2001) also recommends a small number of scenarios in his paper about forecasting.14
to communicate uncertainty externally. As said above, some research papers suggest that a
large number of alternative sets of assumptions can be approximated with Bayesian
probability distributions. However, this approach cannot be viewed as a substitute for expert
judgement about relevant uncertainties. For example, it does not solve yet some problems
with the model uncertainty and uncertainty about future paths of exogenous variables.
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several alternative sets of
assumptions
Several alternative sets of
assumptions specified
with respect to the
central forecast
E.g. one alternative set of
assumptions is specified
on each side of the
central forecast
Several alternative sets of
assumptions specified, central
forecast is not emphasised.
E.g. two sets of assumptions
are specified
Examples KW*, CMS* (in these two
studies off-model uncertainty
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(interval uncertainties
specified for inputs of the
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(central forecast in the
second stage)
FD, RBNZ* (“hawkish” and “
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of distribution   
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central inflation forecast
Grouping of assumptions into
sets need not reflect central
forecast
Major pros (1)Does not limit number of
sets of alternative
assumptions.
(1)+(2) Outcome is  valuable
for external communication.
Gives good background
for decision by opening





(e.g. more alternatives on
one side)
Simplicity of grouping
(everybody can have his own
alternative set).
Uncertainties can be treated as
independent.
No need to emphasise the
most likely case.
Major cons (1) Relies too much on the
core model and pre-specified
distribution.
(1)+(2) It is more difficult for








(the total uncertainty can
be over-estimated).
Difficult to use between the
full forecasting rounds (if the
most likely case is not
known).
The matrix can have too many
columns.
Difficult to use for external
communication.
Note: Abbreviations: BoE – Bank of England, BoC – Bank of Canada, CNB –Czech National Bank,
RBNZ – Reserve Bank of New Zealand, SR – Swedish Riksbank. CMS- Cogley, Morozov, Sargent
(2003), FD- Don (2001), HSYB- Hall, Salmon, Yates, Batini (1999), KW – Wallis (forthcoming).
*) In this case, the method has not been applied to the full extent (explanation given in brackets).15
As far as grouping of alternative sets of assumptions is concerned, the survey does not
indicate similar clustering of the real-life strategies in the middle ground as was the case with
the first stage. Also, economic research supports all three possible representations of the
alternative sets. Advantages of three possibilities are more equally distributed than in the first
stage. One may assume that central banks select the possibility that is more suitable for their
institutional settings and that is a good complement to tools used in the subsequent stages.
However, central banks tend to emphasise the central forecast more than research papers
because for them the external communication matters as well as the quality of their decisions.
In the third step, elements of the robustness matrix are constructed. This can be done in two
ways: either by running the full forecasting exercise several times or by estimating the impact
of new assumptions on the key forecasted variables. The former approach gives an advantage
of fully comparable outcomes. It may be more time consuming. The latter approach may be
less time consuming since it does not require the full forecasting round per each element of
the robustness matrix. Another advantage of the latter approach is that the supplementary set
of information need not rely on one (core) forecasting model. Several central banks report
using a suite of models to deal with model uncertainty. The multipliers estimated with the
core model can be modified by expert judgement according to results from other models. The
second approach has also costs because it requires an adequate supplementary set of
information to be constructed. Specifically, judgements or estimates of the impact of changes
in assumptions and of changes in policy interest rates on the forecasted variables must be
known. Also, certain changes in assumptions, such as changes in the model itself, cannot be
analysed fully by the latter approach. It is possible that the first approach is used during the
full forecasting round, while the second one for decisions between two rounds. Both
approaches provide sufficient information content to represent the pay-offs of all alternatives.
VII.  Representing the Pay-offs by Experts
After conducting the robustness analysis, experts can represent the results in a way that
provides the best possible support for monetary policy decision (See Table VII.1). The easiest
way to represent results is to produce a standard set of graphs or tables per each element of
the robustness matrix. This simple tool provides enough information to allow monetary policy
makers to compare the outcomes of alternative scenarios and attach their own pay-offs to
them. Alternatively, experts can assess outcomes themselves, for example by calculating
values of loss function, in order to provide monetary policy makers with an explicit
representation of the pay-offs. This additional exercise makes the results of the robustness
analysis clearer. It is worth noting that priors about the pay-offs are to some extent also
provided by experts if the core model works with endogenous monetary policy.
Considering uncertainty when working with pay-offs is important since the real-life inflation
targeting strategies usually do not work with a point inflation target only. The strategies
themselves have built-in tools to deal with uncertainty such as interval targets or a list of
caveats
39.  This implies that monetary policy makers sometimes need to compare the inflation
forecast with the mid-point of the target as well as the upper and lower bands of the target.
Consequently, if no explicit pay-offs are calculated by experts, it may be quite complicated
for monetary policy makers to consider outcomes of the robustness analysis as well as
variations in the target or targeted index. Economic research suggests that this problem can be
                                                
39 Mahadeva, Sterne (2000) describe a variety of inflation-targeting frameworks.16
solved by calculating the so-called event probability. However, in this case, monetary policy
makers would be again faced with difficulties when dealing with off-model uncertainties.
Decision analysis recommends calculating the explicit pay-offs with the loss function in order
to simplify the assessment of outcomes. On one hand, in this case, an additional uncertainty
may be added to the whole process due to a specification of a loss function. On the other
hand, some central banks assume endogenous monetary policy in their forecasting models,
and hence they are faced with this additional uncertainty anyway.
 The survey shows that the problems with comparing several variants represented by many
tables and considering caveats and targeted bands at the same time are probably not so serious
in reality because central banks do not report working with explicit pay-offs for the sake of
simplification. It is worth noting that for central banks that forecast with models working with
endogenous monetary policy, calculating the explicit pay-offs by experts would not be a
significant deviation from the currently applied methodology. Policy rules already indicate
what the expert views are on the weights of inflation and output in the loss function.17
Table VII.1 – Calculating Pay-Offs by Experts
Event probability Loss function No explicit pay-offs
Description Elements of the matrix
contain probabilities of




Each element of the
decision matrix contains
value of loss function
Each element of the





Examples KW DA, BoC*, CNB*,









The whole targeted range
represented
Components of the target
must be treated explicitly





Caveats can be used to
modify distributions
Caveats must be treated
explicitly
Caveats can be expressed
graphically as an
additional information
(e.g. by adjusting the
forecast)
Major pros Comparison of outcomes
and interpretation of pay-
offs easy




Policy makers can use
expert  priors




Major cons So far very difficult to
produce
Experts must agree on
the formula (loss
function, role of the
target and caveats)
Difficult to assess if
robustness matrix large
or if a range is targeted
Policy makers have no
priors available
Note: Abbreviations: BoE – Bank of England, BoC – Bank of Canada, CNB –Czech National Bank,
RBNZ – Reserve Bank of New Zealand, SR – Swedish Riksbank. DA –decision analysis. KW –
Wallis (forthcoming).
*) In this case, the method has not been applied to the full extent (explanation given in brackets).
VIII. Attaching Subjective Probabilities by Experts
After conducting robustness analysis, experts can also attach subjective probabilities to
alternative sets of assumptions (See Table VIII.1). These probabilities are represented with an
upper row of the robustness matrix. Subjective probabilities can be later used by monetary
policy makers as additional information before the actual decision about interest rates. If this
stage is omitted, monetary policy makers work with an incomplete robustness matrix and they
derive their subjective probabilities and expected pay-offs without employing the know-how
of the experts fully. During this stage, statistical methods cannot be employed since most of
the assumptions in the alternative sets are likely to represent the uncertainty that cannot be
easily represented by objective distributions. That is why economic research does not offer a
complete solution. Experts can use some of the tools suggested by decision analysis. The most
sophisticated tool offered by decision analysis to policy makers is to ask the expert group to
reach a consensus about subjective probabilities. Alternatively, the experts can attach
subjective probabilities individually and these can then be averaged. The easiest way followed18
by several central banks is to allow experts to work with subjective probabilities implicitly
and to reveal them indirectly to monetary policy makers by suggesting a policy
recommendation. In this case, experts usually vote about policy recommendation. If monetary
policy makers have access to the voting pattern, they can learn some information about the
implicit subjective probabilities.
No matter which tool is employed, it is always important to select the expert group carefully
in order to deal with uncertainty efficiently. The expert group should have both an adequate
size as well as a well-designed structure. Specifically, experts should not have the same
background (e.g. it makes no sense to have only the modelling team voting). In addition to the
modellers, other experts in the group should be able to offer detailed knowledge about
problems that are on the list of relevant uncertainties. It follows that the formation of the
expert group may not be easy
40. Also, there is a rule of thumb that each set of assumptions
should be able to get at least 2-3 votes. The composition of the group matters because
individual views about subjective probabilities are according to decision analysis subject to
biases
41. The most common mistakes when assessing subjective probabilities are wishful
thinking (the best outcome is attached the highest probability), experience bias (the alternative
that was observed in the past is attached the highest probability), and overconfidence
(neglecting that subjective probabilities can be wrong).
All the above-described tools employ some methods to deal with these biases. Specifically,
the averaging of individual opinions across the heterogeneous group of experts can be used in
order to reduce biases. The averaging can be done by experts or by a monetary policy maker
who listens to their debate. The latter method is sometimes referred to as the BOGSAT
(bunch of guys sitting around talking) method. Alternatively the expert group can vote
anonymously on a set of proposed subjective probabilities and then the group must discuss the
outcome of this initial voting and agree on consensual probabilities. This method is called the
Delphi method
42. It is probably the most efficient method in reducing the biases but it can be
very time consuming. However, even simpler tools, such as averaging of individually attached
probabilities, can still reduce a significant portion of biases. It is worth noting that all these
methods can be also employed by monetary policy makers in the second stage of the decision-
making process.
Interestingly, no central bank in our survey reports that explicit subjective probabilities
attached by a group of experts to alternative sets of assumptions are fully incorporated into the
decision-making process. In three cases, averaged or consensual probabilities are revealed to
monetary policy makers indirectly during procedures related to the specification of alternative
sets of assumptions. In two cases, experts keep subjective probabilities implicit, with the
exception of the central forecast that is in all cases built as the most likely case. An interesting
strategy is to let the group of experts vote about policy recommendations. Although this
voting reveals something about subjective probabilities, it is not possible for monetary policy
                                                
40 The comment that the formation of the expert group is not an easy task has been made by M. King.
In the case of a significant model uncertainty, researchers that have a deep knowledge of alternative
models can help. In the case of data uncertainty, statisticians that analyse a specific data in a very
detailed way can improve the discussion. The comment that the formation of the expert group is not an
easy task has been made by M. King.
41 Clemen (1996) and Wright, Goodwin (1998) summarize possible biases that can affect
specifications of subjective probabilities.
42 Armstrong (1985) explains the Delphi method, initially developed by the RAND Corporation in
1969 for technological forecasting, in more detail.19
makers to separate this information from information about an implicit loss function of
experts. As a result, monetary policy makers are unable to distinguish whether experts had
applied the “best expected value” rule that should lead to a good decision. As a result, this
policy recommendation may not have as significant value added for monetary policy makers
as it could.
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to experts for policy
recommendation
Experts cannot use all
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Major pros Robustness matrix is
complete. Monetary
policy makers have full







makers have full set of
information prior to their
decision.
Biases in expert judgement
are reduced by averaging.
The easiest option, it
takes one short meeting
to vote
Major cons Time consuming and
sometimes frustrating
Biases  reduced only
indirectly by averaging
Differences between
expert opinions are not
explained.
Expected inflation cannot
be calculated by experts.
If uncertainty high,
recommendation does
not  necessarily lead to a
good decision
Policy makers have no
priors about probabilities.
Note: Abbreviations: BoE – Bank of England, BoC – Bank of Canada, CNB –Czech National Bank,
RBNZ – Reserve Bank of New Zealand, SR – Swedish Riksbank. DA –decision analysis.
*) In this case, the method has not been applied to the full extent (explanation given in brackets).20
IX.  The Interest Rate Decision
In the second stage of the decision-making process, monetary policy makers use all
information presented to them by experts, all additional information they have and their
judgement in order to take the final decision about interest rates.  One can associate this stage
with transformation of the (informal) robustness matrix into a decision matrix. If monetary
policy makers have an important piece of additional information or their judgement does not
correspond to conclusions of experts, the two matrixes can differ significantly. The two
matrixes are also likely to be dissimilar if the robustness matrix was incomplete. This implies
that although the experts can use various methods to deal with uncertainty, some method
should be also employed during the second stage of the decision-making process. As above
mentioned, monetary policy makers can employ similar methods to deal with uncertainty  that
can be used by experts during the previous stage (See Table IX.1).
The system of voting by members of the decision-making body is respected as an important
method to deal with uncertainty, according to decision analysis. Interestingly, the voting is
rarely mentioned among methods that central banks claim to use to deal with uncertainty.
However, all central banks use voting of monetary policy makers as an important weapon in
their battle against uncertainty. The methods go across the whole spectrum from one decision
maker relying on a strong group of advisers to consensual decision-making.  It is worth
remembering that iterations, used to improve the forecast, can be to some extent a substitute
for the consensus method. If several stages of the decision-making process are repeated, the
central forecast can move closer to the best expected outcome. In this case, the likelihood that
the robustness matrix and the decision matrix are similar increases.
There are trade-offs when designing the voting system of the decision-making body. The
more the voting system helps in dealing with uncertainty, the less transparent it is for external
observers. Hence, more sophisticated methods should be complemented with additional
communication tools. Specifically, if the Governor decides about monetary policy interest
rates himself, external observers can extract additional information from his decision. The
observers can combine their knowledge of the published forecast with their guesses about the
Governor’s loss function and subjective probabilities. Subsequently, they can form their views
about future policy actions more easily. If the decision-making body consists of several
members who decide individually, external observers can only make guesses about the
aggregated loss function and aggregated probabilities from the interest rate decision. If one
member of the decision-making body is absent from the policy meeting, the aggregate loss
function and the aggregate subjective probabilities that are behind the final decision are likely
to change. In this case, publishing the votes improves the knowledge about individual loss
functions and subjective probabilities that are more stable than aggregates and hence easier to
predict. If the decision-making body makes consensual decisions, individual loss functions
and subjective probabilities are very difficult to extract for external observers. In this case,
some additional information such as indication of the future policy bias, may be needed to
improve external communication.21
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If voting pattern not
announced, transparency
not so high.
If experts are not
valuable partners in
policy debate, no
additional method to deal
with uncertainty added in
the second stage of the
decision-making process
Note: Abbreviations: BoE – Bank of England, BoC – Bank of Canada, CNB –Czech National Bank,
RBNZ – Reserve Bank of New Zealand, SR – Swedish Riksbank. DA –decision analysis. CMS-
Cogley, Morozov, Sargent (2003), FD- Don (2001), HSYB- Hall, Salmon, Yates, Batini (1999),
KW – Wallis (forthcoming).
*) In this case, the method has not been applied to the full extent (explanation given in brackets).
X.  External Communication
Although the paper focuses on methods to deal with uncertainty for the purposes of decision-
making, it is worth making a few remarks about external communication as well. Methods
dealing with uncertainty often produce useful inputs to communication strategy. It is also
often the case that they are selected because their outcomes can be used for the purposes of22
external communication. After the decision is taken, monetary policy makers targeting
inflation need to communicate why decision was taken and also describe risks attached to the
forecasts. Risks are often communicated in order to emphasise that the probability of hitting
precisely the mid-point of the inflation target is very low
43. For the purposes of explaining the
reasons behind the actual decision about policy interest rates, it is important to describe those
components of the decision matrix that supports the decision. Specifically, if the economic
outlook expected by monetary policy makers does not correspond to the forecast produced by
experts, for example due to different subjective probabilities, this is usually explained in the
minutes from the meeting.
Central banks employ various communication strategies to describe the reasons behind the
decision as well as risks attached to the inflation forecast (See Table X.I). In order to describe
all relevant components of the decision matrix, including the central forecast, central banks
publish a combination of various information. None of them describes the whole decision
matrix to general public. All central banks describe risks attached to the central forecast,
verbally or numerically. These observations correspond to the above-mentioned aims of
external communication. In addition to risks and reasons of the actual decision, some central
banks also publish information about disagreement  among individual policy makers that is
sometimes viewed by the general public as an additional signal of the forthcoming changes in
interest rates.
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Note: Abbreviations: BoE – Bank of England, BoC – Bank of Canada, CNB –Czech National Bank,
SR – Swedish Riksbank.
XI.  Concluding Remarks
  Methods of producing the benchmark forecast as well as methods to deal with uncertainty
are equally important. Monetary policy makers need both in order to make good decisions.
It can be costly if uncertainty is treated only implicitly. The paper offers one possibility of
reducing the potential costs by analysing different methods that are available to monetary
policy makers to deal with uncertainty during the whole decision process. The survey of
methods to deal with uncertainty looked at approaches employed by central banks,
methods suggested by economic research and methods suggested by decision analysis.
                                                
43 Issing (2003) and Budd (1998) stress that it is important to let general public know that monetary
policy cannot prevent all problems.23
The comparative framework was based on the decision matrix that can incorporate all
different types of information important for monetary policy decisions. The matrix also
encompasses various representations of uncertainty used by central banks, such as fan
charts or variant forecasts.
  Central banks employ various methods dealing with uncertainty quite extensively.
Alternative sets of assumptions, comparisons of variant forecasts and policy simulations,
subjective probabilities and voting of the expert groups are all part of their repertoire. In
this respect, monetary policy makers are similar to decision makers leading important
institutions in other areas. This conclusion corresponds to claims made by monetary
policy makers in their papers that the decision-process of the central bank cannot be
approximated with a model-based forecast or a model-based policy rule without
substantial simplifications. As a result, no rule of thumb on how to react to uncertainty can
be applied. Moreover, the decision-making process often takes several iterations in order
to bring assumptions of the central forecast closer to the scenario that yields the expected
outcome. This implies that robust control methods when applied to analysis of monetary
policy should work with decision rules that are closer to the so-called rational rule, such as
the Laplace rule.
  Individual central banks do not always use same methods to deal with uncertainty.
Methods of final voting cover the whole spectrum of possibilities: reaching consensus
among the board members, iterative forecasting procedures, independent votes by
individual members and just one decision-maker with advisers. One can also observe a
large variety of methods when alternative sets of assumptions are specified. They are
represented with the help of probability distributions, with variant forecasts (defined with
respect to the central forecast) or with two boundary sets of assumptions that help to open
the policy debate. Some components of the decision-making process are very similar in all
five cases. Specifically, the central forecast of advanced inflation targeters is typically
model-based, but not fully stochastic. The pay-offs are usually treated by experts
implicitly but some information about them is often revealed to monetary policy makers
via the policy recommendation.
  The variety of methods used by central banks does not cover the whole spectrum of
methods compiled from the survey. Intuition and judgement are not incorporated into the
decision-making process as formally as they are in the decision-analysis framework.
Specifically, experts work with their subjective probabilities and pay-offs only implicitly
in some cases while decision analysis suggests that the know-how of experts could be
more utilised if they reveal this information to decision makers. Use of stochastic
simulations and Bayesian techniques is less advanced in central banks than in theory
papers. Economic research can help with the initial stages of the decision-making process
and decision analysis can improve methods in the latter stages. Although central banks as
a group cover most of the spectrum of available methods, individual central banks do not.
Some central banks choose less formal methods to deal with uncertainty. It is possible that
the core model is developed first after inflation targeting is introduced, and methods
dealing with uncertainty are improved gradually.
  The selection of methods dealing with uncertainty for one stage of the decision-making
process influences the availability of methods during the subsequent stages. For example,
if robustness analysis is not conducted, the expected pay-offs cannot be computed by
experts (unless the probability of the central forecast is one). The selection of methods has
also implications for external communication and central banks often select internal
methods to deal with uncertainty with these implications in mind.
  The full forecasting round, including complete robustness analysis, can be a time
consuming process, and consequently, other components of the decision-making process24
can be used more frequently. In extreme situations, monetary policy makers can decide
about interest rates after updating only information that corresponds to their individual
decision matrix. This may happen, for example, during times of financial or exchange-rate
turbulence when monetary policy makers can hold policy meetings very frequently
44.
  The survey has been designed with the aim to compile and analyse a broad variety of
methods to deal with uncertainty. In several specific areas, there is a need for further
research. More central banks should be added to the survey in order to assess implications
of different institutional settings, such as a multi-country structure, or different economic
conditions, such as problems of emerging economies. More attention should be also paid
to possibilities of constructing subjective probabilities in a more formal way during the
decision-making process. Last but not least, it would be interesting to analyse implications
of different methods for characteristics of the actual decisions about interest rates. For
example, it has not yet been fully established whether opting for fan charts or variant
forecasts affects frequency or size of changes in policy interest rates.
                                                
44 Smidkova et al (1998) documents that policy meetings are very frequent in these circumstances.25
Appendix I
The Decision Matrix Illustrated
Introduction
The decision matrix used in the third section of the paper has been based on the Czech data
from July 2001. This was a period of significant uncertainty for the Czech monetary policy,
and consequently, the results illustrate well methods dealing with uncertainty in a real-life
situation. The robustness matrix has been constructed in the following steps. First, the central
forecast has been produced together with the supplementary set of information
45. Second, two
alternative sets of assumptions have been specified in order to characterise inflation and
deflation pressures with respect to the so-called neutral case. Third, the pay-offs have been
calculated for each combination of alternative sets of assumption and possible policy
reactions. The pay-offs have been derived from a quadratic loss function with inflation and
output terms covering the time horizon relevant for the Czech monetary transmission. Fourth,
several decision rules have been applied in order to formulate policy recommendations. The
applied decision rules have been selected in order to illustrate the importance of subjective
probabilities. The resulting robustness matrixes represent the decision matrixes under
assumption that a monetary policy maker follows the expert advice.
July 2001: the underlying economic situation
Calculations are based on data available in July 2001 and on the assessment of risks recorded
in the Minutes from July 2001
46. Current evidence supports the view that July 2001  was a
period of considerable uncertainty. Policy interest rates were cut in February 2001, increased
in July 2001 and then cut back in November 2001 in response to changes in the central
forecast as well as in risk assessments by the Board. It is worth summarising the issues that
were important for policy debate in July 2001 since they will form our set of alternative
                                                
45 All calculations presented in Appendix II are based on the simple model of the Czech economy that
is occasionally used in the advisers’ assessment of Situation reports of the Czech National Bank. The
more extensive version of the model is described in Mahadeva, Smidkova (2000). Although the model
used in the Appendix I is quite simple, in July 2001 it explained well the past behaviour of the Czech
economy. Its simplicity fulfils our requirement that producing a supplementary set of information
necessary for this illustration is a straightforward exercise. The model is programmed and solved in
Winsolve. The model consists of the following equations (all variables are growth rates):
(1) cp=c2*pg+(1-c2)*np, where cp is cpi inflation, pg are regulated prices, np is net inflation,
(2) np=(1-c1)*p+c1*(pfd+e), where p is core inflation, pfd are international food prices and e is
exchange rate,
(3) p=(c3-c7)*p(-1)+(1-c3)*(c4*pg+c5*(w-y)+c6*(pf+((e+e(-1))/2)))+c7*(y-ys), where w is nominal
wage bill, y is output, pf are foreign prices and ys is potential output,
(4) w=ww+cp(-4)+y(-4), where  ww is productivity claim made by unions,
(5)y=ys+c8*(g(-4)-cp(-4))+c9*(m(-4)-cp(-4))+c10*(w(-4)-cp(-4))+c11*yf+c12*(cpf+e-p), where g is
nominal fiscal impulse, m is money stock, yf is foreign demand and cpf is foreign cpi inflation,
(6) m=c13+y+cp-c14*(i-cpexp), where i is nominal interest rate and cpexp is expected inflation,
(7) cpexp=cp, where cpexp are adaptive expectations,
(8) e=e(-1) or e=c15*(e(+1)+(i-if-rp)/4), where e(+1) are model consistent exchange-rate
expectations, if is foreign interest rate and rp is risk premium.
The values of the coefficients are as follows: c0=0.85, c1=0.1, c2=0.28, c3=0.5,c4=0.05, c5=0.3,
c6=0.3, c7=0.5, c8=0.1, c9=0.3, c10=0.2, c11=0.3, c12=0.1, c13=0, c14=0.6, c15=0.8.
46 Minutes of the meeting are published on the internet 12 days after each monetary policy meeting.26
assumptions. Firstly, the subsequent forecasts of external variables were changing
dramatically. Initially, there were expectations of upward corrections in external output and
inflation in comparison to the forecast from previous months. These expectations were then
subject to reverse corrections. Secondly, a real impact of government policy on inflation was
different from the officially published intention. Considerable price de-regulations were
expected to take place but in reality they were much slower than the official schedule
suggested. Thirdly, model uncertainty was a problem. Specifically, it was difficult to model
the exchange-rate of koruna that was initially expected to remain stable but it was
strengthening due to large privatisation inflows. Also, the model was overestimating the wage
growth due to an impact of continuing disinflation on expectations.
The central forecast and supplementary set of information
The model and the July 2001 data set, including projections for exogenous variables, have
been used to produce the central forecast that represents the most likely scenario. All
assumptions related to this scenario are components of the so-called neutral set of
assumptions. This set consists of model equations, parameters, zero residuals, past data
known in July 2001 and projections of exogenous variables done in July 2001. The neutral set
is thus neutral with respect to history since assumptions are based on the past data as much as
possible. The set is also neutral with respect to general knowledge since projections of
exogenous variables (such as external prices) are derived from consensus forecasts. Last but
not least, the set is neutral with respect to economic policies because it includes the
assumptions of unchanged interest rates and exchange rate, and official scenario of
government policies (such as price de-regulations). Figure A.1 shows the resulting central
forecast for inflation.
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cp_data cp_II01_central target_mid_point
Note: Variables are defined as follows. Cp_data are data (shadowed for data unknown in July 2001).
CpII01_central is the central forecast for inflation. Target_mid_point is the central line of the corridor
target for inflation.
The model has been used to produce the supplementary set of information that is necessary
for deriving the elements of the robustness matrix. Table A.1 represents components of this
set that were important for the July 2001 policy debate.  The sensitivity of two important
variables that enter the loss function –inflation and output growth – with respect to changes in
policy interest rates was calculated from simulation results. The leverage of exogenous27
variables was calculated by combining information on their historic volatility and sensitivity
of inflation and output to their changes. Table A.1 shows the leverages of two most influential
variables – foreign demand and foreign prices.
The model uncertainty was considered. The past equation errors were calculated. Table A.1
shows the equation that had had the largest mean of residuals. As was mentioned, the central
forecast works with the random walk assumption for exchange rate. The impact of including
the behavioural equation for exchange-rate into the model was considered. Simulations were
used to estimate the impact of this change on inflation and output growth. The government
policy scenario was considered. The central forecast was based on assumption that price de-
regulations would take place according to official schedule. From past experience, it was clear
that de-regulations tend to be slower in reality, partially due to continuing disinflation process.
This asymmetric uncertainty was considered. It is worth noting that three of the above-
mentioned issues -  impact of external variables, exchange-rate equations and impact of
government policies – are common themes to many central banks.
Table A.1 The supplementary set of information




Is impact symmetric ?
Increase in interest rates
(25 b.p.)
-0.016 -0.055 Yes (policy multiplier)
Decrease in foreign demand
(standard error)
-0.204 -0.621 Yes (volatility)
Decrease in foreign prices
(standard error)
-0.879 0.090 Yes (volatility)
Wage equation corrected
(downwards by average error)
-0.207 -0.263 No (average error negative)
Exch. Rate endogenous
(koruna stronger)
-0.207 -0.263 No (risk premium converging)
Price de-regulations slower
(by average past error)
-0.323 0.010 No (over-predicted in past)
Note: Sensitivity is reported in percentage points on a quarterly basis. For example, an increase in
interest rate by 25 b.p. will reduce the inflation rate over the period of monetary transmission on
average by 0.016 percentage points each quarter.
The report on central forecast and supplementary set of information could have been more
extensive. It could have contained forecasts for all endogenous variables and estimates of
impact of all potential changes in assumptions on all endogenous variables, together with
tables reviewing pasta data volatility, past equation errors and performances of alternative
model specifications. However, for illustration purposes, the less extensive Table A.1 is
probably more adequate.
Alternative sets of assumptions
The assumptions of central forecast and supplementary set of information provide a
benchmark for specifying the alternative sets of assumptions. At this stage, expert judgement
and intuition play an important role. In our example, observations about underlying economic
situation were used for selecting potential alternative assumptions. Their selection was also
based on the leverage of the potential changes in assumptions on the inflation and output
growth. The underlying analysis has been summarised in Table A.1. Changes in assumptions
with respect to the central forecast were grouped according to their impact on inflation
forecast. Hence, the two resulting sets are called “deflation pressures” and “inflation28
pressures”. Under assumption that these changes can be viewed as independent shocks, the
impact of each set of assumptions on the  inflation and output growth was calculated. Table
A.2 reports the results.
Table A.2 Two alternative sets of assumptions




Assumptions in the set
Deflation pressures -1.819 -1.048 Lower foreign demand, lower foreign prices,
wage corrected downwards, exchange rate
endogenous, price de-regulations slower
Inflation pressures 1.083 0.532 Higher foreign demand, higher foreign prices
Note: Sensitivity is reported in percentage points on quarterly basis.
Alternative sets can be constructed differently using the same the central forecast and
supplementary set of information. For example, every change in assumption can be treated as
an individual set of assumptions. However, working with two sets is easier and two sets open
a clearly defined space for a policy debate.  Graph A.2 compares the central forecast with the
two alternative outcomes.
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cp_data cp_II01_central cp_II01_defl
cp_II01_infl target_mid_point
Note: Variables are defined as follows. Cp_data are data (shadowed for data unknown in July 2001).
CpII01_central is the central forecast for inflation. Target_mid_point is the central line of the corridor
target for inflation.
Pay-offs calculated
The expert estimates of the pay-offs were calculated for all combinations of the three sets of
assumptions (neutral, deflation pressures, inflation pressures) and the three possible policy
reactions (no change in interest rates, increase by 25 b.p. and decrease by 25 b.p.).  This can
be done either by running full set of nine simulations or by working with supplementary set of
information. In order to produce the expert estimates of pay-offs, the loss function was
specified as follows. The quadratic loss function had the 0.7 weight on the inflation term and
the 0.3 weight on the output term. The function cumulated the loss over the horizon of
monetary transmission. The mid-point of the inflation target was targeted. The potential
output was assumed to grow 2.8 % annually. Table A.3 reports the results.29
Table A.3 The robustness matrix








Reduction in interest rates 13.207 1.216 1.431
No change in interest rates 13.432   1.212* 1.300
Increase in interest rates 13.663 1.215 1.175
Note: The pay-off of the central forecast is marked with *.
Subjective probabilities and policy recommendation
The robustness matrix was used to produce policy recommendations based on different
approaches to subjective probabilities. The easiest approach is to work solely with the most
likely case based on neutral set of assumptions. In this case, two alternative sets are neglected.
The so-called “the best of the most probable” rule selects the policy reaction with the best
pay-off.  Table A.4 illustrates that our policy recommendation would be to leave interest rates
unchanged in this case.
Table A.4 – Applying “The Best of the Most Probable” Rule





Reduction in interest rates 1.216
No change in interest rates   1.212*
Increase in interest rates 1.215
Note: This table is presented in the paper as Table III.1. The best-pay-off is the one with the lowest
value since the loss function is used to calculate elements of the robustness matrix.
The second approach takes things one step further. All three alternative sets are considered
but no subjective probabilities are attached to them. In this case, only decision rules that do
not rely on probabilities can be used. For example, the so-called “maximin” rule finds the
worst pay-off for each possible policy reaction and selects the reaction with the minimal worst
pay-off. This decision rule is an analogy to rules employed by the robust control methods
47.
Table A.5 illustrates that our policy recommendation would be to reduce interest rates in this
case
Table A.5 – Applying “Maximin” Rule
Probability










Reduction in interest rates 13.207 1.216 1.431 13.207
No change in interest rates 13.432   1.212* 1.300 13.432
Increase in interest rates 13.663 1.215 1.175 13.663
Note: This table is presented in the paper as Table III.2. The worst-pay-off is the one with the highest
value since the loss function is used to calculate elements of the robustness matrix.
The third approach progresses even further. Subjective probabilities are attached to the
alternative sets of assumptions in order to calculate expected pay-offs. The easiest way to do
                                                
47 Cagliarini, Heath (2000) explain that this rule is approximated with robust control methods in
Tetlow, von zur Muehlen (2000). Interestingly, this decision rule is suggested by decision analysis for
army officers who need to select their investment strategy. The answer is to invest into weapons that
can minimise the worst possible outcome of the future war or natural catastrophes.30
this is to assume that all three sets of assumptions were equally likely. The so-called Laplace
rule selects the policy reaction with the best expected pay-off. Table A.6 illustrates that our
policy recommendation would be to reduce interest rates in this case
Table A.6 – Applying “The Laplace” Rule
Probability 1/3 1/3 1/3










Reduction in interest rates 13.207 1.216 1.431 5.284
No change in interest rates 13.432   1.212* 1.300 5.314
Increase in interest rates 13.663 1.215 1.175 5.351
Note: The expected pay-offs are (probability) weighted averages of the pay-offs in each row of the
robustness matrix.
Much more effort can be invested into attaching subjective probabilities before calculating the
expected pay-offs. Since we cannot have a group of experts voting about the probabilities two
years after the meeting and pretend that they know only data from July 2001, the assessment
of risks published in the Minutes has been used as a substitute. In July 2001, the inflation
risks were given much higher emphasis during the policy debate. Table A.7 illustrates that our
policy recommendation would be to increase interest rates in this case.
Table A.7 – Applying “The Best Expected Value” Rule











Reduction in interest rates 13.207 1.216 1.431 2.501
No change in interest rates 13.432   1.212* 1.300 2.469
Increase in interest rates 13.663 1.215 1.175 2.444
Note: This table is presented in the paper as Table III.3. The expected pay-offs are (probability)
weighted averages of the pay-offs in each row of the robustness matrix.
Tables A.4-7 can be seen as robustness matrixes produced by experts or decision matrixes (if
policy makers accepted the expert views fully).
Alternative representations of uncertainty
The robustness matrix can encompass various representations of uncertainty used by different
central banks. Specifically, the two extreme sets can be used to open policy debate. This
implies that the central case has a zero probability attached to it when expected pay-offs are
calculated. Table A.8 illustrates this “hawkish-dovish” approach that would lead to a
recommendation to reduce interest rates.
Table A.8 – The Hawkish-Dovish Approach
Probability ½ 0 ½










Reduction in interest rates 13.207 1.216 1.431 7.319
No change in interest rates 13.432   1.212* 1.300 7.366
Increase in interest rates 13.663 1.215 1.175 7.419
Note: This  is an analogy to the approach used by the RBNZ.
Alternatively, subjective probabilities can be implied by an explicit estimate of a difference
between the expected inflation and the central inflation forecast and by specific assumptions31
about a shape of the probability distribution. Table A. 9 illustrates that this “fan chart”
approach would lead to a recommendation to decrease interest rates.
Table A.9 – The Fan Chart Approach
Probability 0.483 0.500 0.017










Reduction in interest rates 13.207 1.216 1.431 7.016
No change in interest rates 13.432   1.212* 1.300 7.121
Increase in interest rates 13.663 1.215 1.175 7.232
Note: The probabilities were derived in order to ensure that the difference between the central forecast
and expected inflation is in line with the analysis of supplementary set of information. This is an
analogy to the approach used by the Bank of England.
Tables A.4-9 illustrate that although central banks can use different ways of representing the
uncertainties, they need to develop very similar supplementary sets of information in addition
to their central forecasts because they need to work with all components of the robustness
matrix, however implicit this may be. The only exception is the “best of most probable”
approach that is the easiest one but can be too costly in terms of neglected uncertainty. It can
lead to the sub-optimal decisions if - for example – alternative sets of assumptions are
asymmetric or inflation and deflation scenarios are relatively probable.32
Appendix II
Summary of the Survey: How Inflation Targeters Deal with
Uncertainty
Short Case Studies on Dealing with Uncertainty
Five short case studies have been conducted in order to document how inflation targeting
central banks deal with uncertainty. Results of the survey are reported in Šmídková (2003).
This appendix gives summary of findings for the purposes of this paper. The five case studies
are described in chronological order according to the year in which the respective central
banks started targeting inflation: the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, the Bank of Canada, the
Bank of England, the Swedish Riksbank and then the Czech National Bank. Only publicly
available sources have been used to produce the case studies. Country-specific information
has been obtained from Inflation Reports, Monetary Policy Statements or Monetary Policy
Reports and research and policy papers published by the five central banks, see Blix, Sellin
(1999), Britton, Fisher, Whitley (1998), Hrnčíř, Šmídková (2001), Macklem (2002), RBNZ
Independent review of monetary policy (2000) and Vickers (1998).
The Reserve Bank of New Zealand
The Reserve Bank of New Zealand started targeting inflation in 1990, and Monetary policy
statements have been published since that time. Economic projections are presented to the
general public in the form of graphs that show the paths for inflation, output and other
variables - such as exports - produced by the central projection for a three-year horizon. In
addition, a graph with a projected path for 90-day interest rates is also published, but only one
quarter in advance. It has been stressed that the inflation forecast is not a policy projection as
in the cases some other central banks, because monetary policy is endogenous in the
forecasting model in order to approximate the strategy of inflation forecast targeting as
closely as possible. Uncertainties and risks related to the central projection and decisions on
interest rates are described verbally. The central economic projection and a description of
risks and uncertainties correspond to the Governor’s decision. The MPC has only an advisory
role, and the minutes from the monetary meetings are not published.
The internal policy debate has three stages. The first stage is focused on broadening the policy
debate. Important issues that should be discussed during the policy debate are identified. In
order to capture the whole range of feasible policy options and to ensure that the policy debate
is robust, selected MPC members are asked to prepare brief notes advocating a “hawkish” and
“dovish” policy stance. The second stage consists of a presentation of the model-based central
projection with a sensitivity analysis and risk scenarios requested by the MPC. In the third
stage, the debate is narrowed in order to reach conclusions, and the policy statement is
drafted. The central projection plays a key role in the policy debate, but it is not the only
factor affecting policy decisions.
The Bank of Canada
The Bank of Canada started targeting inflation in 1991, and monetary policy reports have
been published since 1995. The inflation projection presented to the general public takes the
form of a one-year point estimate with an accompanying verbal description of the general
economic outlook, including the risks of the projection. The economic projection is produced
as the most likely path for the economy. Although the projection is based on the model
working with monetary policy rules, it is not called a forecast in order to emphasise that the
point estimate of future inflation is conditional on various assumptions. In comparison to the33
Bank of England or the Riksbank, the Bank of Canada communicates about uncertainty in a
much less formal way using a verbal description of important risks and their potential impact
on the inflation outlook and a verbal description of alternative scenarios. It is often
emphasised that a multiple-model approach has been taken in order to overcome model
uncertainty.
The internal process starts with the staff producing an economic projection that will be the
reference points for further steps of the decision-making process. Although a suite of models
is used, there is a core model for medium-term projections. In the second step, the main risks
are selected by the Council, partly reflecting the staff’s suggestions, and alternative scenarios
are specified for alternative simulations. In addition to risk analysis, alternative policy
scenarios are also considered and represented with alternative policy rules. As a result, the
Council is presented with a range of projections and a range of policy simulations that can be
compared to the reference projection. Then all projections and policy simulations and
additional off-model information are discussed during the meeting where directors and
experts can recommend a particular policy reaction. Finally, the Council meets to decide on
an appropriate policy reaction, which must be consensual.
The Bank of England
The UK started targeting inflation in 1992. Inflation Reports have been published by the Bank
of England since that time. The Minutes of the MPC meeting are published with the names of
the MPC members and their specific votes. Economic projections presented to the general
public have the form of two-year fan charts for inflation and output growth. Fan charts are
constructed around a model-based central projection. The central projection corresponds to
the mode of the MPC’s subjective probability distribution.  Inflation Reports often stress that
decisions on interest rates are based on a broader set of information than used for the
construction of fan charts, and that monetary policy is not automatically derived from the fan
chart. While the core model works with 150 variables, information discussed on the pre-MPC
briefing typically consists of 500 charts and tables and 1000 variables. Fan charts are
attributed two roles. Internally, their creation facilitates monetary policy debates. Externally,
they help to illustrate the degree of uncertainty faced by the MPC.
The Bank of England organises several rounds of meetings in order to produce the final
projection. In the first step, the suite of models is used to produce the draft projection. The
projections are run under the fixed interest rate assumption, and residual adjustments are
made when necessary to correspond better to expert views or off-model information.
Sometimes, alternative projections are prepared conditioned on the higher and lower values of
interest rates. In the subsequent rounds, the draft projection, off-model information and
assessments of risks are discussed using both “bottom up” and “top down” approaches in
order to ensure that the final version represents the MPC views. After individual risks are
evaluated by the MPC and the staff, they are aggregated to give the overall balance of risks
that is then used to produce fan charts. As a starting point, historical distributions of
exogenous variables and equation error terms are taken, but the final version represents a
subjective assessment of risks. The final projection is not interpreted as the most likely path
for inflation, because not all information have been included in the draft projection and
subsequent risk assessment and because the projection is conditional. Votes of the MPC
members are independent.34
The Swedish Riksbank
The Swedish Riksbank started targeting inflation in 1993, and Inflation reports have been
published since that time. The Riksbank also publishes Minutes of the monetary policy
meetings. Inflation projections in the form of a two-year fan chart have been a part of the
Inflation reports since 1997. The Riksbank communicates about uncertainty related to
monetary policy with the help of the main scenario and a verbal description of the risk
spectrum around the main scenario. The fan chart probability distribution and the table with
percentage probability of different outcomes illustrate the risk spectrum graphically. The main
scenario has been defined as the most likely inflation path, because this definition avoids any
impact of extreme events on the decision even though the Riksbank is aware that there is a
disadvantage with this choice since the whole distribution is not considered. The risk
spectrum need not be symmetrical due to the introduction of skewness of the composed
probability distribution. For example, there is a downside risk if the inflation forecast is more
likely to overestimate future inflation.
Internally, the main scenario and the risk spectrum are created in several steps. The “bottom-
up” process is used, and the main scenario and risks are mostly prepared by experts. If the
Board disagrees with the outcome of the process, the main scenario or inflation forecast
distribution can be adjusted. The main scenario of the inflation projection is based on the
model forecast obtained from a suite of models. Then uncertainty intervals for important
inflation factors are constructed. The assessments of risk factors are subjective because the
stochastic approach would not allow several models, off-model information and subjective
judgments on future risks to be considered. Finally, the inflation forecast distribution is
composed from the uncertainty intervals with a methodology that has been developed
especially for this purpose by the Riksbank. The weights of individual factors for aggregation
of distributions are derived from the underlying forecasting model. The methodology is
similar to that of the Bank of England – for example, it uses a two-piece normal distribution –
but it works with uncertainty intervals differently.
The Czech National Bank
The CNB started targeting inflation in 1998, and Inflation Reports have been published since
that time. The CNB publishes Minutes of the Monetary Policy Meetings that include the
voting pattern without names of the Board members. Inflation projections take the form of a
chart representing the inflation outlook for the whole horizon of monetary policy
transmission. In order to illustrate the scope of uncertainty about the central forecast, the
bands are attached to it, and the chart represents the band forecast. As a result, the public can
compare the inflation target with the inflation forecast on one chart, both in the form of a
bands. The projection of GDP growth is published as an interval forecast for the end of the
year. The forecast is unconditional with respect to interest rates, and their future path,
consistent with the forecast for the forthcoming twelve-month horizon, is verbally indicated
on the press conference. Risks and uncertainties are assessed verbally in the Inflation report.
In addition, important exogenous assumptions of the central forecast, such as development of
import prices or external demand, are explicitly published in order to emphasise that if
external conditions change, the path of policy interest rates will be different from the one
indicated by the forecast.
The internal process of forecasting inflation has several stages. Initially, the Board meets with
a group of directors, advisers and experts in order to discuss the initial assumptions of the
forecast. Attention is paid to model assumptions as well as to the forecasts of external
variables, and several alternative scenarios are specified. Then the central forecast emerges
from the interaction of the core model with expert inputs. In the next stage, the central35
forecast and outcomes of alternative policy simulations are presented to the Board and the
group of directors, advisers and experts, who can then require further adjustments or to
suggest leaving out specific alternative policy simulations. After this meeting, the Inflation
report is drafted. For the purpose of Inflation report, the bands, whose widths are calibrated by
experts independently from the central forecast, are attached to the central forecast in order to
illustrate the risks. During the policy meeting, the new forecast is presented. Afterwards, the
Board discusses the forecast and votes on policy decision in a closed meeting, and one of the
advisers records the Minutes. The Minutes focus on describing the reasons behind the
decision and on illustrating the uncertainties related to the forecast. The votes of the Board
members are independent, it is not necessary to reach a consensus. If no consensus is reached,
the voting pattern is published in order to give additional information about uncertainty to the
general public.36
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